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in general treats the individual as an independent agent—-
able to determine the optimal lifetime strategy for maximizing
lifetime wealth or utility by an appropriate allocation of
resources to investing in schooling (Ben Porath), on-the-job
training (Mincer), occupational training (Weiss) or the
partaking of leisure activities (Becker and Ghez). Yet
the opportunities open to an adult depend to a large extent
on his experience as a child.
Recently Haley (1974) and Stephan (1974) have tried to
incorporate the investment decisions made before adulthood
into the optimal lifetime plan. They extend to the period of
specialization (the period when 100 per cent of available time
is spent in producing human capital), the problem of
maximizing the child's lifetime wealth or utility. Yet it
seems clear that the parents, not the child, determine the
quantity of this early investment. Further the parentst
objective is not necessarily to maximize the child's lifetime
income or utility. The present study attempts to shed some
light on the parental behavior which produced these endowments
by considering them as elements in the parental bequest to
children, which enters the parents' utility function along with
their own consumption.
In order to provide for their children, parents forego
some current consumption. Money income of families is reduced
while mothers supply their labor to child care and withdraw
from the market, or parents reduce their consumption, in order
to pay for their children's education. Many of these choices
involve the sacrifice of current resource consumption in order
to gain larger future consumption, and may thus be characterized
as investment. There exists a considerable variation across
households in the amount time and money devoted by parents to
children. While the quantity of these resources is determinedby parents, theyhavean important Impact on the endowments
a child has at the time he begins to make independent choices.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics
of parents which lead to differences in expenditures of time
and goods on children, and to relate these differences in
expenditures to differences in various measures of well-
being of the child.
If the expenditure of resources in childhood affects the
outcomes in adulthood, the adult distribution of education and
incomes will depend at least partially on investments made in
childhood. There is considerable variation in the amount of
parental inputs children of various socio—economic statuses
receive.The desire to reduce the variance in early inputs
provided the rationale for federal government programs such as
Head Start and Home Start. Detailed time budget data document
the variance.Le±bowitz (1974a) and Stafford and Hill (1974),
Lindert (1974) show. a relationship between adult achievements
and variation in time inputs due to varying family size.
But the attempts to link up adult achievement with time inputs
in childhood made by Lindert (1974), Fleisher (1974) and
Leibowitz (1974a), have had to rely on much cruder estimates
of time inputs. In the empirical work that follows, we will
show a relationship between very specific inputs of time by
parents and later achievements of children.
The relationship between some specific parent actions and
children's achievement has been demonstrated by psychologists.
They have related children's achievement to gross characteristics
of the family environment (economic, social, ethnic, or racial)
or particular qualities of the parent—child interaction, such
as the extent of the parents' authoritarianism, permissiveness,
hostility or mother dominance of child rearing.1 The present
study differs from these psychological studies in attempting to
relate achievement to the quantity of inputs. This involves a
.—3—
recognition that the bequest is not costless. To develop an
endowment parents will have to forego some purely adult con-
sumption, and redirect resources toward their children. That
is, parents face choices and may choose to forego some purely
adult consumption in order to endow their children with——or
bequeath to their children-—the capacity to achieve. The
quantity and quality of resources expended on behalf of
children are expected to affect the child's ability to achieve.
One need not argue that that genetic factors are insignificant
or that no other environmental variables affect the child's
achievement in order to expect to observe a positive relation-
ship between the expenditure of resources on children and
the resulting level of achievement by the child.
We will be looking for evidence of this relationship in
data relating to achievement of three to five year old children
residing in urban, rural and suburban areas in 1969—1970.
Since these data were originally collected for an evaluation of
the effectiveness of the educational television program
Sesame Street, they will be referred to here as the Sesame
data.
Section I will set out a model of parental decisions
concerning the bequest to children, and Section II will discuss
the Sesame data. In Section III a production function for
human capital is estimated in order to determine how quantities
of parents' inputs affect the output of one element of the
bequest--human capital. In Section IV the derived demand for
schooling as part of the bequest is estimated.
I.Investments in Children's Human Capital: A Model
of Parental Choice
If children were slaves, so that their earnings accrued to
their parents over their entire lifetime, then parental decisions
about allocating resources to investment in children could be
analyzed in the orthodox lifetime optimal time allocation context.—4—
However,in spite of some acts of generosity by childrentoward
their parents, we must consider that the returns toparental
investments generally accrue in the first instance tochildren,
while substantial costs are incurred byparents. The fact that
children generally leave their family of origin ata certain
age, called the age of emancipation here, is incorporated into
our model which assumes that a nuclear family exists for two
periods. A nuclear family is defined as a husband—wife unit
with one child.2
In the first period, children live with theirparents,
who derive satisfaction from a Hicksian composite "adult"con-
sumption commodity in which children cannot participate (for
example, going to nightclubs, or reading novels) and from child-
relatedactivities in which children can participate (going on
picnics, reading children's books). In thesecond period children
leavethe family andonly adult consumption activities are avail-
able to the parents, but they also derive satisfaction from the
endowment of human and physical assets that theypass on to their
children at the beginning of period 2. Parents can be conceived
of as making a lump sum financial transfer as well asfreeing
the child to make decisions about whether to buildup or run down
his endowment of human capital. While a substantial cash
transfer is often made at approximately the age of emancipation
to pay college costs, for a wedding or settingup a business,
it may be argued that many parents leave bequests at their death
(i.e., at the end of period 2, rather than the beginning). To
accommodate the later case, it is assumed the bequest is known
with sufficient certainty to allow the child to borrowagainst
it. The total bequest, E, is defined as:
E =M+ pH
where M is the money transfer, H is the human capital stock,
and p is the parents' valuation of this stock, or their
subjective rate of substitution between human and monetary—5-.
bequests. It is not necessary that p equal the capitalized
value of market rents on a unit of humancapital,since parents
may directly derive utility from the child's possession of the
capital.
I assume home—produced humancapitalis related to the
amounts of time and goods spent in activities with children, as
well as to the genetic stock of the child, g, which also comes
from the parents, but is not a control variable for them given
their mate selection; g may be thought of as affecting the
productivity of parental inputs.3 The parentst own attributes,
p, also affect the productivity of inputs. The parents'
education, for example, may be expected to affect the produc-
tivity of time spent with children, and the productivity of
purchased inputs as well.
H =h(x,t;g,p). (1)
In addition to spending time with children, two other uses
of time are defined as:
A =adultoriented consumption in period 1
A =adultoriented consumption in period 2
A =childoriented consumption in period 1
Each of the activities requires time, t, and purchased goods,
A. =f.(t. ,x.). (2) 11 1 1
Parentsare viewed as maximizing the concave utility function
u(A1E) subject to constraints on available time and financial
assets.
In addition to allocating time among theA's1 parents decide
on the optimal mix of the bequest portfolio between amoney trans-
fer, M, and human capital, H.Time and goods spent with children
produce utility directly in period 1, (via A) and indirectly in
period 2, via the utility to parents of the bequest.—6—
.
Thefollowing vectors, defined so as to have one element
for each parent, refer to available time and wage rates. In
addition, the family has financial assets, V0, at the beginning
of the first period.
T. =totaltime available =L.+ t. j= 1,2;i =1,3in
period 1 L. =labormarket time
j i = 2in period 2
=thadult's consumption time in period 1
=thadult's consumption time in period 2
=thadult's time with children in period 1
=marketearnings per unit of time in labor market.
The vectors L and t are chosen by parents, along with the
scalar variables, x. .Pis the price of x or x relative to x i 1 2 3
Parents face the following problem:
Max U(A,A,A) + (pH + M) (3)
S.T. (1) and (2) plus the budget constraint
X2P2 + M =(V+ Y -PaiXal
-X)(l+r) + Y. (4)
The income in periods 1 and 2 can be written in terms of the
parental wealth at the beginning of period 1, V0, plus family
earnings, Y. Earnings depend on wages and time supplied to
the market, which is constrained by the fact that the total time
available is fixed at T. In period 1, T must be allocated
between the market L, adult consumption and time with children.
In period 2, only the first two uses of time are available.
In addition, it is assumed that the ultimate responsibility
f or child care falls upon the mother. The mother must provide
for child care if she wants to supply labor to the market or
to spend time in nonchild related consumption activities.
The wife must buy back her time at a babysitting fee of B/hour—7—
if she wishes to use time in activities apart from children.
Thus, the net wage available to the wife in the first period is
=(W-B)and the opportunity cost of her adult consumption
in period 1 is increased by Bt.
Then is the time input of the th family member
(mother =1,father =2)in the 1th consumption activity.
For ease of notation, the j subscripts will be suppressed,
but it is understood that B ) 0, B =0.Family income
1 2
can now be written:




t >0,(W—B)0, B > 0, if j =1.
Substituting expressions (5) into (4), we form the Lagrangian:
L =u(A,A,A)+ pH+ N) +
X[(V + (W) (T -t-t )-B(L+ t ) -Px—x) (l+r)
1 3 1 1 3
+ w(T —t) —xP -M]. (6)
2 2
Expenditures on goods must be related as follows:
aH
U U 3x lx 2x 3 (7)
(l+r)P P (l+r)
3A.
where U. =--— ix 3A.X.
1 1
Time spent in alternative uses must be related as follows for





Thus there are two forces which lead mothers to spend time
with their children even past the point where =U3.
First, since the time spent is productive in generating human
capital, the utility of such time is not limited to its
consumption component, U3. Secondly, time spent in activities
not involving child care requires a babysitting cost of B,
and this acts as a subsidy to child related consumption activities.
Note that B does not affect the relative allocation of time in
adult consumption between periods 1 and 2. Fathers will maxinize
utility at a point where the marginal utility of time with
children is greater relative to other consumption time than is
the case for mothers, because fathers do not face the cost B,
for releasing time for other consumption. The fact that
mothers generally are responsible for providing child care—-
either through the market or on their own——would be a sufficient
cause of their spending more time with children, without
involving any considerations of the relative inherent produc—
tivity of men and women in such activities. Note that the
existence of parental wealth, V, does not affect the proportions
in which goods and time are allocated to consumption and
children unless it is assumed that one of the activities has
greater than unitary income elasticity. However, for the same
full wealth Vo +wT, a family with lesser initial wealth V1 and
therefore greater wages, W, would be required to have a higher
marginal product of time with children relative to goods.(By
a comparison of 7 and 8, the same could be said of the use of
time and goods in parental consumption.) If the factors which
affect W (education, for example) had no effect on the
technology of producing commodities or human capital we would
expect to see smaller time inputs to both kinds of home produc-
tion by those with greater W. However, if education also
increased the productivity of time in investment, those with
higher wages and education might spend relatively more of their
time in child investment. It is clear also that women who face—9—
lower babysitting costs (other adults living in the family, or
an unemployed husband) will spend less time in child related
activities. (See Heckman, 1974.)
The total bequest of human capital, then, will be a
function not only of the family's wealth, but also of the time
and goods expended in child related activities. This, in turn,
will be determined by wage rates, the productivity of time in
generating human capital, discount rates and babysitting costs.
II. Sesame Street Data
The model outlined above requires data on time and goods
inputs to children of pre—school age as well as data on
financial transfers and human capital accumulated at the age
of emancipation. It would be nearly impossible to find data
on children already nearing adulthood which contained
sufficiently reliable information on the quantities of time
and goods expended on them before their fifth birthday.5
It is rare enough to find any quantitative data relating to
the quantities of time and goods spent on children. The Sesame
data used below, do contain the relevant information on three
to five year old children from five cities in the U.S. in
1969.
Fortunately the demand for total bequest can be imputed
from data on pre-school children. Parents' demand for schooling
can be estimated directly, and the correlation of •76 between
I.Q. at age four and I.Q. at age 17, allows the use of the early
I.Q. as a proxy for the later one.
The data used in this paper, and referred to here as the
Sesame data were originally collected by Ehe Educational Testing
Service (ETS) for an evaluation of the Children's Television
Workshop's television program for pre—schoolers, Sesame Street.
In order to evaluate what children learned from viewing
Sesame Street, a sample of three to five year old children were— 10—
givenvarious tests of learning in the fall of 1969 and the
summer of 1970.
The present research uses the fall tests, taken before
viewing the program and should not in any way be considered
as an evaluation of Sesame Street. In fact, the pretest data
have been used precisely to focus more clearly on the effects
of the home, without confounding them with the remedial
effect of the T.V. program. In addition to the tests of
learning, ETS administered to the pre—schoolers' parents
questionnaires which provided information on family background
and time use by parents and children, and parental aspirations
for their children's schooling achievement. The data used in
the present study covered a final sample of 943 families
who completed both pretest and posttest questionnaires and
had their children tested.
The data collection was carried out in five sites in order
to choose a sample representative of CTW's target populations.
Boston, Durham and Phoenix provided samples of lower SES,
urban, black, and white children in the Northeast, South and
West. Middle class children living in an eastern city were
selected from Philadelphia. Lower socio—economic status
children living in a rural area were chosen from rural northern
California. In each area the target age group consisted of
three to five year olds, which an emphasis on four year olds.
Appendix A contains further details on the sampling method,
and Table A—l contains means for the five sample sites for
several social and economic variables.
The Sesame data provides some evidence on the size of the
bequest of human capital as measured by years of schooling
parents desire for their children. Dave (1963) and Wolf (1964)
have found that parents' expectations for their child's
intellectual status are positively correlated with I.Q. and
actual educational attainments. These expectations may be
considered a measure of desired bequests and the positive S— 11—
correlationcan be interpreted as one fulfillment of investment
plans.
In the Sesame data parents were asked how many years of
school they wanted their children to complete as well as
how many years they thought the children actually would complete.
Table 1 makes clear that these parents have high aspirations
for their children. Over the entire sample of four low income
areas and one middle income area, the average parent would
like 14.6 years of schooling for his child. College graduation
was desired by 64 per cent of the parents. The 3.4 years of
college middle class parents would have liked exceeded by only
1.2 years the amount of schooling desired by the lower class
parents living in a poor section of Boston. Further, there
was considerably less variation in schooling demand for
children than there was in the actual schooling levels of heads
of families (standard deviation of 2.8 for children's schooling,
5.1 for ieads). It has been previously shown (Kahi (1953); Hess
and Shipman (1965); Lewis (1961)) that working class parents
are less likely to expect their children to achieve at the
desired level. It is also true in this sample that the parents
in urban areas thought their children would actually get
2.1 to 2.2 fewer years than the parents desired, while in
suburban areas this difference was 0.8 and 1.5 years respectively.
In Section IV it will be shown that desired schooling shows
very little relationship to price or income variables. The
number of years parents actually expect the children to complete
is a more realistic measure. This measure is shown in Section IV
to be related to price and income variables. While the amount of
schooling parents actually expect their children to achieve is
less equally distributed than is desired schooling level, it is
still substantially above the parents' own achievements.
Parents with more schooling expected their children to
actually obtain more schooling, with the middle class Philadelphia— 12—
sampleexpecting significantly more years than the average, and
the three low income, urban areas anticipating significantly
lower achievement. Parents, however, foresee that years of
schooling will be distributed more equally than in the past,
since the range in average schooling levels expected for
children is 2-1/2 years, while the education of family heads in
the middle class sample exceeds that of family heads in the
Durham sample by 6.1 years. It is striking that the aspiration
of parents for their children's schooling, as well as their
expectation of what will actually occur do not vary across the
sample as much as the parents' own achievements.
The parents with the greatest demand for schooling (those
in Philadelphia and California) have produced early levels of
I.Q. which are higher relative to the mean than their final
demand for schooling is relative to its mean.I.Q.'s of
the Philadelphia and California samples exceed the mean by
.88 and .45 standard deviations respectively while schooling
level they expect exceeds the mean by .67 and .19 standard
deviations. Similarly, the Durham sample expects final
schooling levels .19 standard deviations below the mean,
but their children's I.Q.'s at age four ae .68 standard
deviations below the mean. The parents who demand a larger
final bequest have made greater than proportionate bequests in
the early ages.7
Schooling is a relatively goods—intensive manner of
providing a child with an endowment--that is, the value of
time inputs from the parents is small relative to the cost
of purchased inputs and the value of the child's time.
Producing human capital on the pre—school years is an activity
requiring large inputs of parental time relative to goods.
Because wealthier and more educated parents face a higher
price of time, all time-intensive commodities are more -
costlyrelative to goods-intensive commodities than for parents
.TABLE 1
Mean Bequest desired at Five Sample Sites
Sample Sites
Rural
Philadelphia California Boston Phoenix DurhamAll
1. Grade in school
parents would
like child to
complete 15.4** 14.8 14.2 14.5 14.4 14.6
2. Grade in school
parents think
chilc5 actually
will complete 14.6** 13.3 12.1*12.3* 12.3* 12.8
3. Mother's years
of schooling 13.l** 11.8* 10.7 97*9•9* 10.9
4. Family head's
years of schooling 14.O** 10.8 8.5* 8.0* 7•9* 9.6
5. I.Q. 105.9** 96.4** 85.1 81.2* 71.7* 86.5
Source: Calculated from Sesame data.
Note:
**= significantlyabove mean for entire sample at five per cent level.
*= significantlybelow mean for entire sample at five per cent level.— 14— . lesswealthy or less well educated. Thus one might anticipate
that a parents' time intensive element of thebequest would be
less highly related to income or parental educationthan the
demand for schooling, since wealthy and better educatedparents
would substitute away from time—intensive bequests.However,
pre—school investments, as measured by I.Q. atage four,
are even more highly related to parental education than is the
demand for schooling.
Because of the high correlation between I.Q. atage four
and 17 we can infer that the better educatedparents do
not substitute goods-intensive bequests (schooling) for time-
intensive bequests (I.Q.). This is consistent withprevious
work which indicates that more educated mothers, inspite of
their higher price of time, spend more time with their children
(Leibowitz (1974b) and Stafford and Hill (1974)).
Since I.Q. predicts success in school we cansay that
children who score higher on I.Q. tests have a higher
marginal productivity of time in school. Thus parents would
want to increase the kind of human capital which is measured
on I.Q. test not only for its own value but because it
makes schooling investments more productive. In PartIV, we
will show that I.Q. can be interpreted thisway in the
bequest model. In Part III we will demonstrate that I.Q. at
age four is in fact related to inputs of parents' time and
goods.
III. The Production of Human Capital in the Home
The model of parental demand for endowments of human
capital in their children, assumes that in fact parents have
some control over the human capital stock available to their
children at the age of emancipation. This assumption is
formalized in equation (2), which proposes that the quantity
of human capital produced is a function of the inputs of— 15—
goodsand parental time. Only if parental actions can alter
the childts human capital stocks can the parents be considered
to be investing in their children. If the child's human
capital is unaffected by time inputs by parents, spending time
with children may be considered an activity whose availability
vgries from one period to the next, but which is not funda-
mentally different from other consumption activities. Thus,
the purpose of this section will be to formulate and test a
production function for human capital in the home.
Since the focus of the bequest model is the parents' role
in developing the human capital of their children, we will
look at human capital produced at early ages, before the
parental efforts become clouded by the child's efforts to increase
or decrease his own stock of human capital. We will determine
if parental inputs can be fruitfully interpreted in the context
of a production function for intelligence in the child.
1. Empirical Specification of Human Capital
Production Function
Table 2 lists variables available in the Sesame data
which might be expected to affect childhood I.Q. The first set
of variables are measures of time spent in child related
activities, which are expected to be positively related to I.Q.
Xl, X2 and X5 indicate whether it is a usual activity for the
mother to play with, read to or watch T.V. with the child when
they are together. Holding parental time inputs constant,
attendance at a Kindergarten or Head Start Center implies
greater adult time inputs to children, and should be positively
related to I.Q. While the rationale for Head Start was its
development potential, the effect of day care is not clear, since
much day care is claimed to be solely custodial (Keyserling).
Proxies for the total amount of child related goods present in
the home--the presence of dictionaries and encyclopedias-—should
be positively related to I.Q. Capital goods which are usedTABLE 2
Variables Measuring Inputs to Human Capital Formation
1.Measures of time spent on child related activities
Mother's usual activity when child is at home, are dummy
variables equal to one if the mother usuallyengages in






2.Measures of goods for child related activities are dummy
variables.
KINDER =1if child attends Kindergarten
HEADST =1if child attends Head Start Program
DAYCARE =1if child attends a Day Care Center
ENCYC=1if family has an encyclopedia
DICT =1if family has a dictionary
3.Measures of parental time spent—adult activities and market
work, are dummy variables equal to 1 if the statement is true.
FULLM =Motherworks 35 hours a week or more
PARTM =Motherworks 0-35 hours a week
FULLF =Fatherworks 35 hours a week or more
PARTF =Fatherworks 10-35 hours a week
NOFAT =Nofather
FASIZE =Totalnumber of people living in the child's home,
a measure of alternative demands on mother's time
as well as endowment desired.
x =whenchild is home mother usually watches T.V. by herself
x =whenchild is home mother usually reads by herself
4.Measures of goods for non-child related activities are dummy
variables.
DRYER =1if family has a clothes dryer
DISHWA =1if family has a dishwasher
COLTV =1if family has a Color T.V.
BWTV=1if family has a black and white T.V.
HIFI =1if family has a HiFITable 2 (continued)
5.Measures of the quality of parental time are continuous
variables:
EDMOT =highestgrade in school completed by mother
EDHEAD =highestgrade in school completed by male head
of household
6.Other variables affecting production function
RACE =1if child is black
SPAN=1if child is of Spanish origin
LANG =1if native language is not English
SEX=1if child is male— 17— . fornonchild related activities may be laborsaving, such as
dishwashers, dryers--in which case their net effect is to
increase the time available for home investment.But these
variables may also be interpreted as proxies for income.To
test this hypothesis, we include other capitalgoods, also
positively related to income, which are not labor saving. We
hypothesize that the effect of "labor saving" capitalgoods
on H should be more positive than the effect of othercapital
goods--such as color T.V. or hi—fi.
Time spent in adult consumption or in work is time not
spent with children and therefore is expected to be negatively
related to I.Q. FULLM and PARTM are dummy variablesequal
to unity if the mother works full time or part time;FULLF,
PARTF and NOFAT are dummy variables which indicate if the father
works full time, part time or if there is no father in the home.
The dummy variables X4 and X6 indicate that the motherengages
in nonchild related activities (watching T.V. andreading by
herself) while the child is with her. FASIZE, a measure of
the number of other children in the household is alsoexpected
to be negatively related to time spent with the child whose
human capital stock is being estimated, since thepresence of
other children in the family increases the MP of parents' time
and tends to lead them to allocate less of it toany one child.
Although older siblings may spend time with their younger
brothers and sisters, since we hypothesize a positive effect
of education on H, the net result of more siblingson I.Q.
should be negative.
The quality of parental time, as well as its quantity,
might affect measured I.Q.Education of the parents is used
as a measure of this quality factor. Because we have shown
above that mothers are likely to spend more time in child—
related activities than fathers, it is expected that mothers'
education is more likely to enhance the production of I.Q. and
thus to show a larger effect in the regression results. Time— 18—
budgetstudies verify that mothers spend nearly four times as
many hours with children as do fathers (Leibowitz (1974b)).
Other variables which may affect I.Q. (or its measure-
ment) in a systematic way are: RACE, SEX, SPAN and LANG,
which are defined in Table 2. Age does not affect I.Q.,
because I.Q. is an age adjusted measure of mental age for a
given chronological age. Appendix Tables A and B presents means,
standard deviations and simple correlation for the sample.
2. Estimates of the Production Function
Table 3 presents estimates of a linear production function
for human capital for the entire sample. In column 1 we see
that measures of the quantity of mothers' time inputs to
children and other activities support the production interpreta-
tion. Family size is a measure of competing demands for the
mothers' time, the more children there are, the less time the
mother can spend with each child individually. The empirical
estimates show that each additional sibling in the family
reduces a child's I.Q. by a significant amount. While full—time
and part—time work by the mother have a negative effect on a
child's I.Q., neither is significantly different from zero.
Capital goods which are labor saving in nonchild oriented
activities are expected to be associated with greater time inputs
to children, holding other family demands constant. The presence
of these capital goods (dryer, dishwasher) is associated in the
expected positive direction with I.Q. These capital goods were
not merely acting as proxies for income or socio—economic status,
since other capital goods which are not labor saving (color
television, black and white television or hi-fi) had no significant
effect (see column 4).
Previous studies employing time budget data have shown that
more educated mothers spend more time with their children
(Leibowitz, 1974). Thus mothers' schooling level may represent














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































children.In the estimated production function there is a
strong positive relationship between mothers' schooling and
their children's I.Q.Because mothers spend much greater
amounts of time with young children than do fathers, the effect
of mother's education is expected to outweigh the effect of
father's, if the relation between parental education and
childhood I.Q. is of a production nature. However, if parental
education is merely a proxy for genetic stock or family income,
the impact of mothers' and fathers' education should be equally
strong. The inference of a production relationship is supported
by the significant effect of mother's education and the
insignificant effect of fathers' education on childhood I.Q.
Fathers' work status and absence of father were also not found
to be significantly related to early human capital stocks.
(Regressions not shown.)
The proxy measure of goods entering the production of
human capital (the presence of an encyclopedia), also has a
positive effect on I.Q. Race and Lang indicate that black
children's I.Q.'s are measured as 13 to 15 points lower than
white children's, and children whose native language is
not English score almost 7 to 8 points below other children
with similar family backgrounds. However, children of Spanish
origin (Puerto Rican or Mexican) did not show significantly
lower I.Q.'s, once the fact that English was not their native
language was taken into account (note the insignificant
coefficient on SPAN in column 4). Sex was not significantly
related to I.Q.
The mother's education may have a strong positive effect
on the child's human capital acquisition either because it affects
the quantity of time inputs, or because it affects the quality
of time inputs--making all parent-child interactions more pro-
ductive or because it alters the ways in which time is used.
To further investigate the latter possibility, the specific
activities mothers reported engaging in while children were— 21—
presentare entered into the production function. These results
are presented in column 2 (Table 3). The activities fall in two
classes—-those that involve interaction with children, and those
that can be defined as adult—consumption.
The variables reflecting time spent with children indicate
that how mothers spent time with children may be as important as
how much time they spend. Reading with children was the activity
which had the greatest effect on measured I.Q. The children of
mothers who read score higher I.Q.'s; reading with the child is
more productive than reading alone. Children of mothers who
watch T.V. while the child is present have lower measured I.Q.'s.8
Playing with the child was negatively associated with I.Q.,
even though it represents time spent with children.
Among the inputs of child-oriented purchased services which
may affect a child's I.Q. are kindergarten, Head Start and Day
Care. Column 3 reports their respective effects on I.Q. While
kindergarten was positively related, attendance at a Head Start S
or Day Care Center had no statistically significant effect.
The lack of any effect of Head Start on I.Q. is consistent with
the results of studies initiated specifically to evaluate
Head Start programs (Westinghouse, 1969).
Since the urban sample contained a substantial proportion of
blacks (66%), while the suburban sample contained few (2.4%)
and the rural sample none, separate regressions were run for the
three sample sites to insure against the race variable acting
merely as a proxy for urban residence. (In spite of the fact
that a Chow test indicated the hypothesis that the set of
coefficients did not differ among the samples could not be
rejected at the five per cent level, F =1.26.)Tables 4, 5,

































































































*Note: No children in this subsample had a native language






















PARTM —3.38 .80 —3.67
RACE 1.47 .15 1.85
EDMOT .95 1.14 1.00
ENCYC 1.48 .52 1.23
DRYER 4.33 .79 4.99
DISHWA 2.83 .98 3.37
LANG*










Intercept 84.64 84.55 82.57







I.Q. AS A FUNCTION OF FAMILY INPUTS
RURAL SAMPLE--59 OBSERVATIONS
1 2 3
Independent Variables t t t
FASIZE —1.24 .97 —1.36 1.09—1.17 .98
FULLM —10.96 2.08 —12.342.33 —6.39 1.21
PARTM 1.32 .22 2.19 .37 2.27 .41
RACE*
EDMOT 3.42 2.82 3.583.04 3.04 1.93
ENCYC 8.66 2.11 8.15 2.04 9.77 2.50
DRYER —3.85 .82 —4.40 .97 —3.67 .87
DISHWA 2.53 .48 2.39 .44 2.57 .53
LANG —2.34 .21 .95 .09 —4.20 .39
EDHEAD .03 .06 .06 .12 .44 .87
=Playwith child -1.41 .32
X =Readto child 4.03 .96
X5 =WatchTV with child —10.99 2.72
X6 =Readby self 4.02 .83




Intercept 60.94 56.86 74.97
R2 .39 .44 .56
*Note: No children in this subsample attended day care,
and none were black.— 25—
Inthe urban sample (Table 4) we still seestrong negative
race and language effects, but the mothers' education effect
is greatly attenuated. Among the time inputvariables, family
size retains its importance, but work status loses itsnegative
impact on I.Q.All the activities mothers engage in seem to
affect their children's I.Q. less significantly,perhaps
reflecting the fact that these mothers' lower schooling levels
cause them to be less productive in all activities. Goods, on
the other hand, appear to be even more productive in the urban
subsample than in the total sample——as seen in the increased
effect of encyclopedia and kindergarten. However,day care
and Head Start still show no effect on human capital
acquisition.
The only significant predictor of differences in I.Q.
within the suburban sample (Table 5) is whether the mother
reads to the child. In contrast with the urban sample where
race exerted a negative effect on I.Q., black children
living in suburban areas scored as high as white children
once inputs to the production of human capital are held constant.
Perhaps, black families living in suburban areas have moved to
those areas because the better schools reduced the cost of
providing their greater demand for human capital in the bequest.
The measures of goods inputs (encyclopedia, kindergarten) are
largely insignificant, due to the fact that these families are
well endowed with capital goods. The gross measures of time
inputs (work status, dryer, dishwasher) are also not significant
predictors of I.Q.However, the specific measures of how time
is spent are even more strongly related to human capital,
perhaps reflecting the greater productivity of time of more
educated mothers.
Table 6 presents regressions for the rural sample. The
measures of goods inputs (encyclopedia and kindergarten) are
significantly positive in their effect on I.Q. stocks. The
.— 26—
measuresof the quantity and quality of time inputs are also
significant determinants of human capital stocks. Children
of mothers with full-time employment, average I.Q.'s 11 points
below children whose mothers have part time or no employment
outside the home.When the child care arrangements of the
children are taken into account (equation (2)), a 12 point
I.Q. deficit is associated with a mother's working full time.
However, when the specific activities of the mothers are
accounted for (see equation (3)), this deficit is halved, to a
six point difference in I.Q.'s. Most of the explanatory power
of these activity variables lies in those relating to T.V.
watching. Mothers who watch T.V. with their children and
"alone" in their children's presence have children with I.Q.'s
which average 11 and 13 points respectively below otherwise
similar children. The activity variables also act to reduce
the coefficient on the mother's education variable, since more
educated mothers are more likely to engage in the human capital
producing activities (reading) as opposed to the activities
associated with lower I.Q.'s (T.V. watching). Thus, we can
conclude that the activities mothers share with children
affect the children's human capital acquisition as much as
the mothers' education or how many hours a day she is home.
• In contrast with the urban sample, greater family size is
not related to lower human capital stocks. Additional children
seem not to affect human capital acquisition in the rural or
the suburban sample. Perhaps this is another way in which the
marginal cost of (constant quality) children is less outside
urban areas.
Summarizing the results of the production function
estimation, we can conclude:
1. There is strong support for the production
function interpretation, with both goods and
time inputs affecting human capital acquisi-
tion in the predicted direct±ons.— 27—
2.The mother's education was significantly related
to the children's human capital, while the
father's was not. Variables reflecting father's
work status also showed no significant effect on
their children's human capital.
3. Full-time work status of the mother is consistently
negatively related to I.Q. differences, but in the
sample where this effect was strongest (the rural
sample), the gross effect of this variable was
halved by the inclusion of specific activity vari-
ables. In no case was part—time work a significant
variable.
4. There appear to be decreasing returns to some goods
inputs in the production of human capital, since
the effects of kindergarten and encyclopedia are
lower in the suburban sample (where the 61per cent
of families has encyclopedias, and 38 per cent of
children attended kindergarten) than in the urban
and rural samples where respectively nine per cent
and 18 per cent of children attended kindergarten
and 46 per cent and 43 per cent of families owned
encyclopedias.
5. There is evidence that more educated mothers are
more productive in all activities, since the effect
on human capital outputs of given inputs was
greater in the non—urban samples where mothers have
more schooling.
6. Non-white children score 13-14 points below white
children in I.Q. tests in urban areas, even when other
variables are held constant, but did not score— 28—
significantlybelow white children in suburban
areas.
7. The specific activities that mothers engage in with
children are as important as the gross measures of
socio—economic status. In particular, children
whose mothers read when they are present develop more
human capital than children whose mothers watch T.V.
in their presence.
IV. The Bequest Demand and the Derived Demand for Schooling
The parents' desired bequest to children is a useful
theoretical construct which is difficult to implement
empirically. Even if the total cost of inputs to children's
human capital could be estimated, accounting for financial
transfers to children would prove difficult. However, it is
possible to estimate the derived demand for a bequest input
which accounts for a major share of the bequest value. The
particular input to be studied here is years of schooling
demanded by the parents for their children.
If the bequests parents provide for their children are
ordinary economic goods, then their quantity would be expressed
to be positively related to income and negatively related to
price. The price of the bequest can be measured by the utility of
the forgone parental consumption. Assume that adult consumption
is subject to decreasing marginal utility, and parents attempt
to equalize the size of the bequest to each of their children.
Then a given size of bequest is more costly in terms of lost
adult consumption to a family with more children (see Becker
and Lewis, 1973). Thus, family size may be used as an index of
the opportunity cost of the bequest. Family income will be
measured by parental education. The derived demand for schooling
will depend upon its own price, the prices of other inputs to
the bequest, the price of the bequest itself relative to other
parental consumption and family income.— 29—
Theprice of schooling varies greatly as does its quality.
One useful measure of the cost of schooling is the time
required to complete a given number of years of education.
Ability can be defined in terms of the time required to learn
(Carroll, 1974). Those who learn quickly are said to have high
ability (and therefore low "cost" of learning), while those
who learn more slowly face higher costs of learning and there-
fore are said to be less able. In the derived demand foryears
of schooling, I.Q. will be used as an inverse measure of the
cost of acquiring schooling. Since I.Q. predicts best the
ability to acquire knowledge in schools, this would seem to be a
reasonable interpretation of its effect on schooling. In the
context of the family bequest model, I.Q. is then seen as com-
plementary to schooling, since it reduces the cost of additional
schooling (i.e., raises the marginal productivity of time in
learning), and should have a positive coefficient in the
regressions. However, an alternative hypothesis is that I.Q.
represents a stock of human capital which is desired for its
own sake, and is a substitute for years of schooling.(It would
then have a negative coefficient in the regressions.)
A demand equation of the following form is estimated:
S =f(Edmot, Edhead, Fasize, I.Q., Race, Sex)
and the results are represented in Table 7 for the entire sample
and for the three subsamples. In the first column, where the
dependent variable is the amount of schooling parents actually
expect their children to complete, price and income variables
are seen to affect the demand for schooling in the expected
direction. Both income proxies——education of the mother and
father--have the expected positive relationship to the derived
demand for schooling, with the mother's schooling exerting a
larger and more significant impact on demand than father's
schooling. The negative effect of family size confirms that
the greater the opportunity cost of the bequest to one child,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lowerthe cost of acquiring that schooling, the greater the
demand, as seen by the significant positive relationship between
demand for schooling and early I.Q.6 Whileparents desire
significantly more schooling for their sons than their
daughters (by nearly one—half a year), once price and income
factors are held constant, race has no significant impacton
demand for schooling measured by actualyears parents anticipate
their children will achieve.
However, a slightly different picture emerges if the demand
for schooling is measured by the amount parents would like their
children to have not the amount they expect them actually toget.
In column 2, the dependent variable is the number ofyears
parents would like their children to remain in school. In this
case the price elasticity of demand is nearly zero, for both
the price of the total bequest (measured by family size) and
the price of schooling itself (measured by I.Q.). Parents, then,
are considering costs when they indicate how much schooling they
think their children will actually get, but when they state how
much schooling they'd like their children to have, they are
abstracting from the costs of schooling. The income effect is
also attenuated in this case, but the effect of mother's
schooling remains positive and significant. It is apparently
not a price or income effect which determines the lower
demand for schooling for daughters for parents desire about
one half a year less for daughters in both the actual and
"costless" cases.
Looking at the demand functions for the subsamples, we see
that in each area mother's education is more highly related than
father's to the actual years of schooling expected. There is a
particularly strong income effect in the suburban sample. While
the cost of the total be4uest (as measured by family size) is
important in all but rural areas, the cost of schooling (measured
by I.Q.) is important only in urban areas.
It appeared in all three samples that a smaller schooling
bequest was desired for daughters than for sons, with the greatest— 31—
"discrimination"occurring in the high income suburban area.
However, it is reasonable to expect some interaction between
mothers' education and that of daughters. Duncan (1974) documents
that mother's education is a significant predictor of daughters'
education, while father's education was more closely related to
son's education. Therefore, an interaction variable, GIRLED,
(which equals the mother's education for girls, zero for boys)
was included in the regressions in order to test if more educated
mothers demanded more education for their daughters. The total
effect of maternal education on demand f or daughters schooling
will be (+)where is the coefficient on EDMOT and is
1 2 1 2
the coefficient on GIRLED. The effect on demand of having a
college graduate mother rather than a high school graduate mother
is calculated for each sample site:
Suburban Sample + 2.4 years
Urban Sample +.2 years
Rural Sample + 2.0 years
While in the suburban sample college graduates desired 2.4 more
years of schooling for their daughters, there was a smaller effect
in rural areas, and none at all in urban areas. In suburban
areas, the interaction effect completely accounts for the effect
of mothers' education on demand for schooling. Mothers with
slightly more than two years of college demand equal schooling
for their sons and daughters.
Black families in urban areas want significantly more
schooling for their children than do white families, while this is
not true in suburban areas. However, in urban areas there is
less discrimination against daughters in terms of the schooling
bequest. For the urban sample, an interaction term reflecting
the presence of a black daughter revealed that the greater demand
for schooling by black families was due to the fact that these
families wanted more schooling for their daughters relative to
their sons than did white families.— 32—
Ifparents are efficiently allocating investments among
children (that is, equating marginal rates of return) black parents
would have less of an incentive to demand more schooling for boys
than girls, since black girls can expect higher lifetime labor
force participation, thereby raising the profitability of any
given investment in schooling. However, the greater relative
demand by black families for bequests to their girls did not show
up in early investment, since the race—sex interaction had no
significant effect on I.Q.
The "cost" of schooling, as measured by I.Q. has a small
effect on demand, registering an elasticity at the mean of .07 in
the rural and urban sample, and no significant effect at all in
the suburban sample. Early human capital thus seems not to be a
substitute for schooling, but is weakly complementary to it.
However, the cost of the total bequest (as measured by family
size) and the income variables affecting total bequest are of
greater importance in determining the derived demand for
schooling.
We can conclude from this estimation, that the derived demand
for schooling shows positive income elasticity and negative price
elasticity. Further, the price of schooling itself——as measured
by I.Q.-—has a stronger effect in the urban sample where the
mean I.Q. of the sample is low, than in the rural and suburban
samples where sample average I.Q.'s are higher. However, I.Q.
shows its greatest effect in the pooled sample. Because early
human capital (I.Q.) is a complement to schooling in producing
the total bequest, the families with the greatest demand for
schooling are the families which have invested most intensively in
their children in their pre—school years. And the variance in
demand for total bequest is much greater across these samples than
within them. In fact, because community schools are the locus of
much of the investment in children between the ages of 6 and 18,
we would expect parents with similar demands for bequest to
congregate. This, however, abstracts from the very real problems
that people living in urban areas would have moving to either
suburban or rural areas.— 33—
V.Summary
Inthis paper we have developed a theoretical framework in
which to consider parents' investment in their children.
Ultimately, children may decide to add to or reduce their endow-
ment of human capital by balancing discounted marginal costs and
marginal returns. But when they make those decisions in their
adulthood, their parents' prior investments will have deter-
mined their "initial" conditions. These parental investments as
we have seen, are made on the basis of the parents' utility
function, and will not necessarily be those that would have
maximized the child's lifetime income as seen from the time of
birth.Although the parents' investments may not coincide
with those that would maximize the child's lifetime income
stream, these investments are nonetheless the result of rational
processes which are amenable to economic analysis.
We have shown that the demand for a major aspect of the
endowment parents bequeath to their children-—years of
schooling——is related to price and income factors, we have
demonstrated that I.Q. measured at age four is a complement to
years of schooling in building up the bequest. We have
estimated a production function for I.Q. at four which demon-
strates that time and goods inputs controlled by parents affect
measured I.Q.This is consistent with viewing I.Q. as
produced within the home and with viewing I.Q. as a measure of
human capital which parents bequeath to their children.
The ability to explain early human capital accumulation and
demand for years of schooling supports our hypothesis that
parents remain the decision makers——at least until their children
are five years old!REFE HENCE S
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.FOOTNOTES
*The research reported here was initiated with the support
of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
in a grant to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Later
in the project the author was supported by a grant from the
Bureau of Health Services Research and Development of the U.S.
Public Health Service. I have benefitted from many discussions
of investments in children with Professor Bernard Friedman,
with whom the bequest model has been jointly developed. Thanks
are also due to Dr. Edward Palmer, of Children's Television
Workshop, who provided me with the Sesame Street data.
1Extension to the case where there is more than one child
involves considerations of economies of scale in raising children,
the parental decisions on the optimal number of children and their
spacing. These considerations would greatly complicate the
model, and will be brought into the empirical work by assuming
they are exogenous and merely affect prices faced by the
parents.
2Schooling outside the home also produces human capital,
but with little input of parental time.
3Although there appear to be two constraints--money and
time, this problem reduces to one of maximization under a
single constraint because time is convertible into money at
the fixed wage rate W.
'This sample is described at length in Appendix A.
5An exception is the Terman sample used in Leibowitz
(1974)
6See Bloom for a summary of these correlations.
71t is interesting to note, in view of the low I.Q.
scores in the poor, urban areas that only only three per cent of
parents responded that their children's actual schooling
achievement would fall below their hoped for level due to lack
of ability, while 32 per cent said insufficient family finances
would cause children to complete fewer years than desired.. 8Thedistinction between watching T.V. alone and with the
child may not be meaningful, since in neither case is the
mother interacting with the child. Interacting with the child
while watching a child-oriented programapparently is produc-
tive of human capital, since the analysis of the effectiveness
of Sesame Street by E.T.S. showed that children who watched
Sesame Street with their mothers showed larger knowledge gains
than other children. Ball (1970, p. 369).
S
.APPENDIX A
Sample selection for the Sesame data was carried out as
follows:In Boston, Durhamand Phoenix, areas showinggreatest
poverty were specified by local officials, and "neighborhoods"
around Head Start centers were then defined in these poverty
areas. Between 25 per cent and 60 per cent of the sample in each
area was composed of children from the Head Start center. The
remainder of the sample consisted of all the eligible children
(aged three to five) in the designated "neighborhood." This
"at—home" sample was located by a house—to—house canvass of the
neighborhoods. It is estimated that almost all eligible
children in the specified areas were located, and the subsequent
cooperation rate was 97 per cent.1
In the middle class Philadelphia sample it was relatively
difficult to locate pre—schoolers who were not attending nursery
school or kindergarten. Thus parents of pre—schoolers who
agreed to cooperate were asked to suggest names of other non—
enrolled pre—schoolers in their area.
In the rural California sample, 10 school superintendents
provided names of pre-school children from poor families in
their area.
The initial testing was carried out on 1124 children from
five sites. Due to illness and family moves out of the testing
area, 17 per cent of the children could not be located for
the post—testing. Complete records were, however, obtained for
943 children, who compose samples on whom data were available for
the present study. The final sample contained a majority of
at—home children, of lower class black children, and of four
year olds, as can be seen in Table A.In order to assure com—
parability across children only the 805 children whose mothers
answered the parent questionnaire are included in the present
study.
1Ball (1970), p. 21.A
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